The BRUTUS automatic cryptanalytic framework by unknown
J Cryptogr Eng (2016) 6:75–82
DOI 10.1007/s13389-015-0114-1
REGULAR PAPER
The BRUTUS automatic cryptanalytic framework
Testing CAESAR authenticated encryption candidates for weaknesses
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen1
Received: 16 January 2015 / Accepted: 15 November 2015 / Published online: 7 December 2015
© The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This report summarizes our results from secu-
rity analysis covering all 57 competitions for authenticated
encryption: security, applicability, and robustness (CAE-
SAR) first-round candidates and over 210 implementations.
We have manually identified security issues with three can-
didates, two of which are more serious, and these ciphers
have been withdrawn from the competition. We have devel-
oped a testing framework, BRUTUS, to facilitate automatic
detection of simple security lapses and susceptible statisti-
cal structures across all ciphers. From this testing, we have
security usage notes on four submissions and statistical notes
on a further four. We highlight that some of the CAESAR
algorithms pose an elevated risk if employed in real-life pro-
tocols due to a class of adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks.
Although authenticated encryption with associated data are
often defined (and are best used) as discrete primitives that
authenticate and transmit only complete messages, in prac-
tice, these algorithms are easily implemented in a fashion that
outputs observable ciphertext data when the algorithm has
not received all of the (attacker-controlled) plaintext. For an
implementor, this strategy appears to offer seemingly harm-
less and compliant storage and latency advantages. If the
algorithm uses the same state for secret keying information,
encryption, and integrity protection, and the internal mix-
ing permutation is not cryptographically strong, an attacker
can exploit the ciphertext–plaintext feedback loop to reveal
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secret state information or even keying material. We con-
clude that the main advantages of exhaustive, automated
cryptanalysis are that it acts as a very necessary sanity check
for implementations and gives the cryptanalyst insights that
can be used to focus more specific attack methods on given
candidates.
Keywords Authenticated encryption · CAESAR ·
BRUTUS · Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks · Automated
cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
Authenticated encryptionwith associated data (AEAD) algo-
rithms provide message confidentiality and integrity protec-
tionwith a single cryptographic primitive. As such, they offer
functionality similar to combining a stream or block cipher
with amessage authentication code (MAC) on protocol level.
This two-algorithm approach has been the predominant
way of securing messages in popular Internet security proto-
cols since mid-1990’s. Its potential problems were identified
early by Krawczyk and others [22]. Still, current TLS 1.2
[11] mandates support only for the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_
128_CBC_SHA cipher suite, which combines AES [28] in
CBC [12] Confidentiality Mode with SHA-1 [31] hash algo-
rithm in HMAC [30] Message Authentication mode, and
a TLS-specific padding scheme. Similar approaches have
been taken by other popular security protocols such as IPSec
[20,21] and SSH [52]. This separation has been exploited by
numerous real-life attacks [10,33,45].
When authenticated encryption techniques such as GCM
[29] are used, most problems related to intermixing of two
separate algorithms (such as padding) are removed. Fur-
thermore, AES-GCM works in a single pass, resulting in
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increased throughput and a decreased implementation foot-
print. AES-GCM has rapidly replaced older methods in
practical usage. It is endorsed and effectively enforced for
US and Allied National Security Systems [9]. AES-GCM
has been adopted for use in many protocols, including TLS,
SSH, and IPSec [7,18,41]. However, GCM is widely seen
as an unsatisfactory standard with brittle security assurances
[32] and therefore a new NIST-sponsored competition, com-
petition for authenticated encryption: security, applicability,
and robustness (CAESAR), was launched in 2014 [8]. The
CAESAR competition has multiple stages or “elimination
rounds.” The call for algorithms resulted in 57 first-round
candidates.
Structure of this paper and our contributions We give a
description of AEAD that most CAESAR candidates con-
form to in Sect. 2. We started our evaluation by getting to
know the voluminous supplied documentation, which led to
cryptanalytic results on three candidates (Sect. 3). We then
describe the development of our framework for automated
cryptanalysis, BRUTUS, in Sect. 4, together with security
usage notes obtained. A key observation which may not have
been fully considered by all submitters is the non-atomic
nature of AEAD in real life, which is captured in the notion
of adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks (Sect. 5). The candi-
dates can be classified according to their robustness against
adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks, which generally do not
apply to AES-GCM. This is done in Sect. 6, and we con-
clude in Sect. 7.
2 Authenticated encryption with associated data
Most CAESAR authenticated encryption algorithms with
associated data (AEAD) algorithms have the following
inputs:
K A secret, shared confidentiality, and integrity key.
N Public nonce or initialization vector. Optionally
transmitted.
P Message payload, for which both confidentiality and
integrity is protected.
A Associated “header” data. These data are only authenti-
cated.1
The AEAD transform will output a single binary string C
that contains additional entropy bits for detection of modifi-
cations:
AEAD(K , N , P, A) → C. (1)
1 Associated data A may be transmitted unencrypted or implicitly
known to both parties (meta information such as message sequence
numbers and endpoint identities).
The inverse transform will only return the original message
payload P if correct values for K , N , A, and C are supplied:
AEAD−1(K , N ,C, A) → P or FAIL. (2)
We may semi-formally characterize the security require-
ments for AEAD and AEAD−1 which are relevant to this
work as follows:
1. Confidentiality Even if a large number of chosen (N , P,
A) (with non-repeating N ) can be supplied by an attacking
algorithm to an encryption oracle AEAD(?, N , P, A) →
C , it should be infeasible to distinguish the corresponding
outputs C from equal-length random string.
2. Integrity It should be infeasible to create any new set
(N ,C, A) that would not output AEAD−1(?, N ,C, A) =
FAIL for an unknown key, even if a very large number of
valid (N , P,C, A) sets for that secret key are available.
More trivial security properties follow from these require-
ments. Each submission was free to define what “infeasible”
in their particular casemeans. For the confidentiality require-
ment, this is traditionally expected to mean effort commen-
surate with an exhaustive search for the secret key K . The
forgery effort (integrity goal) depends on the size of authenti-
cation variable (message expansion from P to C), but can be
defined to be lower. For example, AES-GCM archives a sig-
nificantly lower level of integrity protection than information
theoretically expected [34,37]. As CAESAR is a crypto-
graphic competition, we may consider all such suboptimal
features to be relative weaknesses.
3 Manual cryptanalysis
CAESAR candidates came in many shapes and sizes. We
refer to [1] and the authenticated encryption zoo web site
for classification and current status of each one of the candi-
dates.2 Here’s our rough breakdown:
8 Clearly based on the Sponge construction.
9 Somehow constructed from AES components.
19 AES modes of operation.
21 Based on other design paradigms or just ad hoc.
A group of proposals cannot be even evaluated according to
established cryptologic criteria and we sidestep those in this
report.
We spent some time familiarizing ourselves with the
substantial amount of technical documentation after it was
released in March 2014. Based on the specifications alone,
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1. PAES [51] suffered from rotational cryptanalytic flaws
as round constants were not used. Similar observations
were made simultaneously by Sasaki and Wang [42] and
Jean and Nikolic´ [19] teams. PAES has been withdrawn
from the CAESAR competition.
2. HKC [16] was found to suffer from an almost linear
authentication function, which could be used for high-
probability message forgeries. HKC has been withdrawn
from the CAESAR competition.
3. iFeed[AES] [53]. We offered criticism towards this pro-
posal as the authentication tag depends only on the last
block of the plaintext.3
4 Exhaustive methodology: the BRUTUS
framework
By June 2014, most of the 57 teams had submitted reference
implementations for their candidates. Many of these can-
didates had multiple parameter choices and optimizations,
bringing the total number of implementations to over 210.
The implementations were integrated into the SUPER-
COP4 speed testing framework by D. Bernstein. In addition
to very rudimentary coherence testing, the sole functionality
of SUPERCOP is in performancemeasurement. SUPERCOP
is not very well suited for statistical testing or other experi-
mental work.
4.1 Development process
We decided to build our own testing framework which would
allow more rapid experimentation. We lifted the reference
implementations from the SUPERCOP framework as we had
no use for it. Our BRUTUS5 toolkit compiles each reference
implementation into a dynamically linked library that can be
loaded “on the fly” into an arbitrary experimentation pro-
gram. The standard test module performs coherence testinga
and speed tests, and generates test vectors known as known
answer tests (KATs). Interfacingwith arbitrary languages can
be archived via small native components.
Due to the disappointingly poor quality of some of the
code (even fromsomeprominent cryptologic security teams),
many implementations had to be corrected to fix memory
leaks and other elementary errors that affected stability of
experimentation. We avoided modifying the mathematical
structure of the implementations even when it appeared to
contradict the supplied documentation. BRUTUS is intended
purely as a research and experimentation tool.
3 Similar issues apply to some other proposals such as OCB [24] and
OTR [25], which restricts their usage in protocols where some level of
collision resistance is expected.
4 http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html.
5 https://github.com/mjosaarinen/brutus/.
4.2 Identifying ciphers and modes
An interesting advantage gained from having a coherent and
easy interface for all ciphers is that an “identifying gallery”6
of proposed modes and ciphers can be constructed. This
allows black-box identification of ciphers in some cases.
The diagrams are independent of secret keying information.
Figure 1 shows some members of this gallery.
4.3 Implementability and side channels
It is clear that some proposals are poorly suited for hardware-
only implementation. For example, any algorithm actually
requiring malloc() dynamic memory allocation—which
in itself is a side channel security headache—is difficult to
implement in hardware. How this will be addressed is left to
the CAESAR committee as hardware implementations are
not expected before the second round. Some proposals have
been implemented in FPGA. The proposed SÆHIAPI allows
generic, hybrid software-hardware implementations and is
therefore able to cover almost all candidates [40]. BRUTUS
is capable of supporting this API.
4.4 Performance
We refer to SUPERCOP results for software performance
metrics across a number of implementation targets. Speed-
optimized implementations were not even expected for first-
round candidates, so such comparisons would be unfair (the
call was for “readable” implementations, which was rather
liberally interpreted by some teams). Efficient implementa-
tion of parallelized modes in plain ANSI C is nontrivial. As a
generic note, none of the proposed AESmodes seem to reach
the authentication speeds attained by AES-GCM—thanks to
AES-NI finite field instructions that directly support GCM.
Furthermore, somemodes are not entirely parallel, and there-
fore cannot reach themaximum throughput speeds attainable
byAES-GCMand offer little or no advantage over it.We urge
careful analysis of these factors during selection.
4.5 Security usage notes on various ciphers
We tested basic forgery strategies, the effect of key and nonce
modifications to ciphertext, and diffusion of changes in the
cipher state. From our automated testing, we arrived at the
following notes:
1. CMCC [44] does not use all of its keying materials for
short messages, and therefore, a trivial forgery can be
made even if a part of the secret key is not known. The
author has proposed a tweak.
6 https://mjos.fi/aead_feedback/.
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Fig. 1 Visualization of
feedback properties of some
CAESAR candidates. Here each
pixel represents a single byte.
Grid lines are every 16 bytes
(128 bits). The Y coordinate is
the single plaintext byte change
location offset. Each pixel line




tag is usually seen as a bar on
the right side; those bytes are
affected by any change. The
“ripples” on the lower three
diagrams are one indication of
inconsistent mixing
2. CALICO [43] had an extraordinarily long key (32+16 =
48 bytes), which consists of a 32-byte decryption key
and a 16-byte MAC key. If you have a false key (with
something else in the first key 32 bytes), CALICO will
not detect it and will just output nonsense. This can be
circumvented in implementations but does violate basic
AEAD security expectations. The author withdrewCAL-
ICO from the competition earlier.
3. PAEQ [5] implementations exhibited a property in which
authentication of associated data only (i.e., no payload)
did not depend on the supplied nonce at all, leading to
replay forgery attacks in case a protocol is sending A
only. The authors noted that the specification forbids such
messages (but were allowed in actual implementation for
compatibility), but areworking on a tweak.Weencourage
such a tweak as this would make the proposal plug-in
compatible with AES-GCM in security protocols where
signaling frequently demands authentication of metadata
only.
4. YEASv2 [6]. Although it is mentioned the specification,
the nonce has only 127 effective bits. The ignored bit is
bit 0 of the last of byte of the 16-byte IV sequence. This
is an unfortunate selection; if we are using network (big
endian) byte order, this is the least significant bit of the
nonce. If running sequence numbers are used, every two
consecutive messages will have equivalent nonces and
security will break.
All of these issues are fairly easy to address. Again we ignore
less professional proposals that do not meet basic sanity and
CAESAR compliance criteria.
4.6 Implementation security
Based on our cursory code review of the 210+ implementa-
tions, our general advice is strongly against using CAESAR
reference ciphers as a part of any real-life application requir-
ing stability or security at this stage of competition.
5 Most AEAD are not atomic
When described in the fashion of Eqs. 1 and 2, an AEAD
transform appears to be an atomic, indivisible operation.
Two-passCAESARcandidates can essentially only be imple-
mented this way. The AEZ [17] and SIV [23] candidates are
examples of such “All-or-nothing Transforms” [35].
Due to efficiency and memory conservation reasons, most
CAESAR candidates can work in “online” mode where the
full plaintext block P is not required for the encryption algo-
rithm to be able to produce some of the ciphertext. This is
generally done by dividing the message to uniform-sized
message blocks pad(M) = M1 || M2 || · · · || Mn . The
AEAD maintain an internal state X which is initialized with
some value derived from K and N . This is then iterated over
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blocks Mi and the final state is subjected to another transfor-
mation to produce a MAC tag T .
X0 = key(K , N ) Initialize state from key and
nonce.
Xi = mix(Mi , Xi−1) Mix message blocks with state,
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Ci = out(Xi ) Block derived from state, 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
T = fin(Xn) Finalization—compute the
authentication tag.
The ciphertext is constructed as
C = C1 || C2 || · · · || Cn || T . (3)
This type of construction allowsCi to be output immediately
after Mi is fed into the mixing transform. All Sponge-based
[3] constructions and many proposed block cipher modes of
operation fall into this category.
5.1 The adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack
The adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack applies to AEAD
designs which are not necessarily based on block ciphers at
all.We assume that an attacker can adaptively feed a plaintext
block Mi to the cipher as a function of previously observed
ciphertext blocks
Mi = fatk(C1,C2, . . . ,Ci−1). (4)
The attacker function fatk can perform some reasonable
amount of computation for the feedback operation.
We argue that this is a relevant model offering insights
especially to smart card applications and other lightweight
applications where an attacker has full control over the com-
munication channel.
The goal of the attacker is to derive information about the
internal state Xi . This information can be used in attacks of
various degrees of severity:
1. Distinguish or partially predict Ci+1.
2. Fully derive Xi ; predict all future Ci and T .
3. Derive information about K .
Note that message authentication is not an issue in an
adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack on an AEAD as encryption
cannot really fail. The inverse scenario of Eq. 4, a chosen
ciphertext attack, is less realistic as it would seem to auto-
matically break the definition given by Eq. 2. However, this
scenario has been considered in the literature [2].
6 CAESAR candidates and real-life protocols:
susceptibility to adaptive-chosen-plaintext
attacks
In order to integrate a CAESAR AEAD into a real-life pro-
tocol such as TLS, SSH, or IPSec, one has to define not only
the appropriate ciphersuite identifiers but also the usage and
formatting mechanisms.
In case of all AEAD, an obvious path of integration is
to adopt the mechanisms used for AES-GCM in relevant
RFCs: TLS in [41], SSH in [18], and IPSec in [7]. This will
allow implementors to essentially “plug in” the algorithms
into existing protocol implementation frameworks. In many
protocol instances, the ciphers are subjected to adaptive-
chosen-plaintext attacks with relative ease.
Even though theCAESARcall for algorithms7 was careful
to require concrete security claims for full AEAD trans-
forms, the security claims related to this type of attack are not
explicitly stated for many ciphers. However, internal mixing
qualities of a design offers a direct insight into the robustness
of a cipher against adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks.
Based on our automated analysis, at least ACORN [47],
AEGIS [50], MORUS [48], and TIAOXIN [27] represent
significantly elevated adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack risk.
We are formalizing our observations, but we note that—as an
example—the effective internal state can be trivially forced
to be smaller, helping birthday attacks. These proposals have
a single statewithout separation between authentication, con-
fidentiality, or keying state. In this, they are similar to Sponge
designs. Indeed, if these had been labeled “sponge designs,”
they could be declared “broken” due to the weakness of their
mixing functions. This illustrates the difficulty of security
comparisons among candidates.
In many ways, these ciphers resemble Helix [15] and Phe-
lix [46], which were proposed as an authenticated stream
ciphers a decade ago. These ciphers were attacked in under
various assumptions [26,49]. Another earlier, similar (but
lightweight) authenticated design is theHummingbird cipher
[13,14], which was successfully cryptanalyzed [36,38].
These ciphers seem to have been created with ad hoc
design methods and offer no provable security assurances.
This by no means indicates that they cannot be used securely
and use of these candidates may be highly justified in many
cases as they are among fastest (or, in case of ACORN, small-
est) candidates.
In comparison, we offer the following proof sketches for
resistance of certain other essential classes of algorithms to
adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks of this type.
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Proof The Galois/counter mode has an essentially indepen-
dent counter mode and a polynomial-based authentication
mechanism. Since the counter mode keystream can be gener-
ated a priori to encryption, any ciphertext–plaintext feedback
will not yield useful information about the internal state of
the mode. unionsq
Theorem 2 Sponge modes with strong permutations such
as DuplexWrap [4] or BLNK [39] are not vulnerable to
adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof These modes utilize a cryptographically strong per-
mutation between any two blocks of data, and therefore, the
adaptive attacker has no access to capacity beyond that bar-
rier. unionsq
As there are some proposals that employ various stronger
notions of provable security, we make the following general
observation:
Observation 1 Provably secure modes that have two or
more passes over data are not vulnerable to adaptive-chosen-
plaintext attacks.
Figure 1 offers a visualization of Theorems 1 and 2 and
the final observation.
7 Conclusions and further work
We have presented a summary of our initial examination and
analysis covering all 57 CAESAR first-round proposals (we
are only presenting results that we have obtained ourselves).
As an executive note, we strongly recommend against using
any of the first-round CAESAR ciphers in real-life applica-
tions despite their novelty and often famous authorship.
During manual examination, we have identified crypto-
graphic problems with three proposals, two of which have
been withdrawn from the competition.
We have described our development of the BRUTUS
testing framework which allows tests to be made that auto-
matically cover all candidates. As performance testing was
not even required in the first round (and is adequately
addressed by the SUPERCOP toolkit), we focused on the
structural differences of various candidates. We offer secu-
rity usage notes for four candidates.
From the BRUTUS automated tests, we observe that
some candidates offer less than convincing resistance against
adaptive-chosen-plaintext attacks. This is significant since
one of the main motivations for the CAESAR competition
is to seek secure replacements for the AES-GCM algorithm
which is provably secure against this type of attack. Sponge
permutation designs and two-pass provably securemodes are
also resistant. Such an attack can be mounted with relative
ease in conceivable instances of real-life protocols such as
TLS, SSH, and IPSec.
Based on our experience, the most valuable output from
exhaustive, automated testing across actual cipher implemen-
tations is that it catches implementation errors and possible
errors in security usage—discrepancies between the assump-
tions of the users of the algorithm and its designers. These
often break real-life protocols and applications that utilize
encryption algorithms. The insights obtained from statistical
testing of (internal) quantities can be used by a cryptanalyst to
focus more specific analysis efforts against those candidates
that are expected to be vulnerable to a particular method of
attack.
We intend to extend this work to performance analysis,
analysis of hardware implementations, and statistical analy-
sis of the internal cipher state for the second-round CAESAR
candidates.
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